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Abstract―This research describes and analyzes the strategies of 
politicians to attract voter support in electoral politics by 
providing patronage goods or club goods.  The study of this 
strategy is increasingly relevant considering the Covid-19 
pandemic that has emphasized to political actors the importance 
of social assistance (in Indonesian: bansos,etc.).  In some areas, 
especially those with a flow-political landscape in the form of 
strong links between parties and social and religious 
organizations, it shows that local politicians are cooperating 
with organizations that share a platform with parties to 
distribute social assistance.  However, this research confirms the 
academics' opinion, such as Edward Aspinall, who believe that 
giving from politicians with the motive of gaining mass support 
for party interests, and of course electoral politics, can be said 
to be an affirmation of patronage democracy. Through 
comparative analysis with several cases of social assistance 
distribution that have existed, this study strengthens the main 
thesis about patronage items as a binding of loyalty between the 
mass of voters whose numbers are very beneficial for parties and 
party politicians. 
   
Keywords―Social Assistance, Patronage, Clientelism, Party, 
Organization. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HE Covid-19 pandemic has changes several lines of life, 
especially the citizens economy. Several business unit 
and jobs that have been the source of residents’ income have 
had the most significant impact. The threatened welfare 
condition prompted the government to take the initiative to 
help through subsidies and the provision of social assistance 
which summarize in the Social Safety Network (JPS). 
In the program which becomes a Government mainstay, 
Social ministry as frontline, declare three forms of major help 
ie social support, acceleration of implementation of “Kartu 
Prakerja”, and cutting the electricity bills. Other than Social 
Ministry, several ministries just like the Ministry of education 
and Ministry of Manpower also release the support program.  
Because of the citizens economic have been helped by this 
program, so this phenomenon became interesting input for 
politic actors to get the community attention. Some 
politicians immediately participating on channeling aids to 
community, either politicians as government official or 
politicians as party officials, just like the head of the peoples 
representative council (DPR) of Republic Indonesia Puan 
Maharani who went directly to distribute social assistance to 
the community.  
In the political sciens view, Scientist said that the pattern 
or political system always adapt to environment (David 
Easton). If this case put in the context of this widespread 
social assistance provision, then it can be said that the 
political actors operating within the system will use the social 
help method as their strategy to get the citizens attention. The 
long-term goals are clear, that is electoral political interest.  
The such a statement get strong claim after the case 
revealed by Bawaslu. In their explanation to BBC News 
Indonesia, Bawaslu commissioner namely Ratna Dewi 
Pettalolo said that her team found several politician cases – 
the point is a candidate for regional head – who put their 
photos in goods intended as social assistance. The same cases 
als do by one of PKB party politician when they share 
thousands of packet of the social assistance in Jember and 
Lumajang [1]. The assistance is in the form of 40 tons of rice, 
8000 packet of staple material, and thousands of personal 
protective equipment like mask and hand sanitizer.  
For the community view, the various of social assistance is 
helping their financial burden becomes light. The open 
statement of social assistance contribution is found in several 
opportunities while asking the citizens opinion.  
Meanwhile, electoral politics that demands competition 
among politicians as well as moments of gaining voter 
support prompt political actors to seek the right strategy to 
ensure the votes they need to win electoral elections. In this 
case, the study of political science on a concept called 
influential representation. 
As it basic meanings, representation means “acting for” [2] 
If this  representation is used for explore the endogenous 
factor behind such practices, then it Will show the assumsion 
about political actor behavior that use social assistance as 
their program in this pandemic just to reap certain things 
oriented. It seems that in the context of political parties, the 
interest in getting mass votes for victory in electoral politics 
is the most rational "object of struggle" to be discussed. 
Furthermore, the choice of social assistance as the medium 
for launching this motive is the community psychology which 
has a quick response in terms of economic. It is quite clear 
that the economy is the most influential basis in shaping other 
orders, such as politics. Based on the analysis using the 
Marxist approach, the economy is referred to as the 
infrastructure of life on which a superstructure stands in the 
form of other aspects of life. Just like Vedi Hadiz said that the 
mixture between economy and politics was so thick in the 
post-reform era [3]. In the realm of political praxis, this can 
be found in the presence of a vote buying pattern that is 
coherent with the rationality of society in choosing, or what 
is called the rational choice view. 
Therefore, the impact behind the change in looking at the 
economic aspects of politics gives rise to pragmatic 
reasoning, where people will only choose candidates or 
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people's preferences lead to certain parties that provide them 
with social security through economic welfare - even if in the 
short term in the form of assistance, or in the language of 
Aspinall. called "retail". It is hoped that with the social 
assistance provided for the community in the midst of the 
crisis due to Covid-19, politicians and parties will benefit in 
the form of people's preferences to channel their votes in 
elections.  
In some cases, social assistance is provided by politicians 
in society who have loyalties to it, or at least people who have 
the possibility to be embraced even though they are not 
formal loyalists and sympathizers. As happened in Brebes, 
which showed a PKB politician distributing Educational 
Operational Assistance to Islamic boarding schools. As stated 
by some political analysts, such as Aspinall, pesantren is the 
basis of PKB loyalists [4]. 
In this way, the provision of assistance by PKB politicians 
can also be interpreted as an effort to bind the loyalty of the 
masses of voters to politicians and parties. Because pesantren 
has become an institution that has a very strong influence in 
society, interested parties always try to approach the 
pesantren so that their agenda can run smoothly. 
Rizkika Lhena Darwin successfully demonstrated the same 
thing through a thesis that supports this argument. Candidates 
or politicians often visit several institutions, especially 
pesantren, with many programs that can attract the attention 
of pesantren to be willing to support them and - thus - 
mobilize their mass [5]. 
This study will analyze how social assistance, which was 
originally intended to a priori help overcome the economic 
threat of citizens, is used at the same time as club goods or 
patronage items that have an electoral political impact for 
politicians. 
II. METHOD 
This study using qualitative method which purpose to 
understand the object deeply. Such research has implications 
for the approach the researcher uses, namely the qualitative 
approach. The qualitative method is also defined by Bogdan 
and Taylor – quoted by Moleong – as a series of research 
procedures that produce descriptive data in either written or 
oral form from people as the unit or behavior being observed 
[9]. 
This is considered appropriate, because in particular 
qualitative research consists of investigations that seek 
answers to questions, systematically use a standard set of 
procedures to answer questions, gather evidence, and produce 
findings. Therefore, qualitative research is very effective in 
obtaining information about values, opinions, behavior, and 
certain social contexts [9]. 
Often times such models are called descriptive-analytic 
methods. McCall and Simmons provide the essential 
elements of this method. First, using concepts, propositions, 
and empirical generalizations from a scientific theory. 
Second, using collections, classifications, and facts 
systematically. Third, produce new empirical generalizations 
based on these data. This analytical description method is 
considered by both of them to be the most effective 
alternative, armed with research work efficiency and its 
application strength in the field [10]. 
The resulting data will be processed using the techniques 
proposed by Miles and Huberman. According to them, 
activities in data analysis are data reduction (summarizing, 
selecting, and focusing data), display data (presenting data, 
such as describing it), and conclusion drawing / verification 
(concluding findings). So that the activities in qualitative data 
analysis in this study were carried out interactively and 
continued continuously to completion [11].  
This research uses clientelism as the main theoretical 
framework. In this study, researchers agree with the 
definition put forward by Aspinall and Berenschot that 
clientelism is “… The practice of exchanging material 
resources or benefits (money, goods, jobs or positions, public 
services, contracts with government institutions, etc.) with 
political support (votes, donations of campaign funds, 
campaign support, etc.)." While patronage “… refers 
specifically to goods or benefits that are exchanged through 
clientelistic practices”[12]. 
Actually, patronage often refers to the practice of 
exchanging non-programmatic goods, such as those sourced 
from a candidate's personal finances or party coffers. 
However, seen from the modus operandi in clientelistic 
practices, programmatic goods such as social assistance are 
gates that can lead to clientelistic practices, because they have 
the potential to be diverted into patronage goods. Everything 
is seen from whether the provision of patronage items is 
based on careful calculation or identification of the mass of 
recipients regarding their loyalty and certainty in choosing 
the beneficiary or just a mere distribution of assistance in 
general without any selection and identification. If the answer 
is the first one, then the practice is clientelistic using 
patronage goods as a binder. 
Thus it can be identified that there are at least three 
elements in clientelism, namely contingency or reciprocity, 
hierarchical which means that power relations between 
patrons and clients are carried out unequally like politicians 
and receiving societies, and the repetition aspect which 
means that the practice is repeated in every edition of the 
general election. The latter element becomes the researcher's 
point of emphasis based on the assumption that this social 
assistance does not stop only during the pandemic, but will 
be repeatedly applied by politicians in their strategies, 
because it has proven successful in getting high attention 
from people who have a “rational choice” view. 
In connection with this patronage, the research conducted 
by Lucky Dhandy Yudha Kusuma entitled Afiliasi Politik 
Kiai Nahdlatul Ulama dalam Pemenangan Pasangan Irsyad-
Gagah pada Pilkada Kabupaten Pasuruan 2013 very 
important to accommodated[13] 
Armed with patronage theory and the concept of religious 
elites during the general election, Lucky made important 
findings, namely that there was a patron-client pattern 
between NU kiai and PKB. The provision of assistance and 
guarantees that promises to be a patronage item is operated.  
The thing that binds the two of them apart from needing 
each other is also the inevitable existence of material or 
economic offers. But more than that, through a psychological 
approach, the Irsyad-Gagah pair received support from the 
IPTEK Journal of Proceedings Series No. (7) (2020), ISSN (2354-6026)                        
The 2nd International Conference on Global Development - ICODEV 
December 5th, 2020, Online Conference 
 
20 
NU kiai not only because of the PKB factor, but because 
Irsyad-Gagah had a number of platforms that were in line 
with the NU kiai. 
That means, in the study of patronage, politicians will only 
give the benefits they have to supporters who are attached, as 
binders, and sympathizers who are willing to vote, as a 
contract. The key word is clear, namely, “You will get this 
item only if you support and / or choose me”. 
As a guideline for research that has been conducted by 
academics, Mulyadi Sumarto's study is written in his book 
entitled “Perlindungan Sosial dan Klientelisme: Makna 
Politik Bantuan Tunai dalam Pemilihan Umum” researchers 
will develop. 
In the research published at the end of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla's administration, Mulyadi 
departed from Wood's (2004) thesis which argued that the 
more social protection distribution programs managed 
directly by the government, it should be able to reduce the 
practice of clientelism, because it reduces client dependence 
on patronage items from its patrons.  
But in fact, in the case of Direct Cash Assistance (BLT), 
orientation to answer the needs and rights (entitlement) of 
public welfare has been transferred to become a kind of 
patronage item from the political elite who used it as a vote 
buyer to win the 2009 presidential election. 
 According to Mulyadi, countries in Latin America have 
actually pursued the same thing, one of which is Brazil with 
conditional cash transfers (CCT). Such programs are also 
used as a patronage for candidates, especially the incumbent, 
to win the presidential election (pilpres). President Lula in 
Brazil, for example, used the CCT program known as the 
Bolsa Familia to succeed his ambition to run in the 2006 
elections. 
The difference is that in Indonesia, the modus operandi of 
clientelism and patronage democracy in Brazil is very open 
and persistent, as when President Lula admitted frankly that 
his victory was inseparable from his ability to run the Bolsa 
Familia. Meanwhile in Indonesia, such practices run 
informally, incidentally, and are not equally felt by the wider 
community.  
Next, the two developments in clientelism studies below 
will serve as guidelines in capturing the strong reasons behind 
the operationalization of patronage items carried out by 
politicians. 
1) Culturalist 
At this time, research on political clientelism uses a 
culturalist approach, in the sense that the relationship 
between two actors (patron and client) is largely determined 
by the extent to which cultural norms are carried out by 
members of society.  
James Scott, for example, examines the patron-client 
relationship practiced by landlords and farmers. Both are 
involved in the patron-client relationship which forms the 
basis of clientelistic practice, because there is an element of 
reciprocity and the transfer of economic and political choice 
autonomy through the norm of 'respect' [14]. 
Actually, this first wave cannot be said to be political 
clientelism because its existence is so smooth that it is not 
realized by farmers. The thing that underlies the relationship 
between the two is not a political tendency - although in some 
rural (rural) areas landlords often benefit politically in the 
process of selecting positions - but the norm of reciprocity, 
because the patron has provided the land for the peasants, the 
peasants must automatically benefit the patrons. In addition, 
this practice has three fundamental weaknesses, so that when 
it is drawn into an analysis of the face of modern clientelism, 
it is easily refuted. These weaknesses are that there is an 
imbalance in the exchange between the two partners which 
expresses and reflects differences in relative wealth, power, 
and status; A sustainable pattern of reciprocity that builds and 
strengthens patron-client bonds often creates trust and 
affection that are bound by primordial values, whereas in 
modern clientelist practice it is political and economic values 
that underlie network exchanges; and finally, the patron-
client relationship is carried out by a widespread "whole 
person", rather than an explicitly impersonal contractual 
relationship [14]. 
2) Marketist 
In this wave, political scientists began to see clientelism as 
strongly associated with massive industrial development. The 
industrial upheaval on all fronts has had a significant 
influence on political considerations held by society. They 
began to shift from cultural considerations to rational. Thus, 
this second wave represents what is called by Aspinall as the 
marketies approach [12]. 
The appearance of this approach just as we said concurrent 
with behavior of choosing a rational society in identifying 
itself to the "whom". Researchers who believe that the 
marketies approach is the basis for clientelists' behaviors and 
patronage democracy, among them Susan stokes, who 
considered rational issues such as economic growth and 
development to be the reason for their clientelism practice 
[15]. 
This principle of rationality in electoral politics by Saiful 
Mujani and Liddle (2010) is defined as identification by 
voters to a set of priorities of goals, such as economic growth, 
general prosperity, national unity, education, and the rule of 
law [16]. Meaning in clientelist practice, the client decides to 
accept or not an offer from the patron based on a 
consideration of the merits to be obtained. So this model 
completely nullifies where the 'respect' norm is, even on a 
limited scale, while also challenging the more appropriate 
culturalist approach occurred during the “politik aliran” 
(politics of flows). 
In fact, the “politik aliran” (politics of flows) is still in 
operation today through the fact that the giving of goods by 
politicians is usually degenerated by like-minded supporters, 
such as fellow NU. However, the marketies approach is more 
than just ideological considerations such as the culturalist 
approach claims, where the 'willing' element behind the 
practice is dominant. Because based on the marketies' 
opinion, what bonds and maintains the clientelism's 
relationship is a patronage supplied either to its loyalist 
supporters or simply to sympathizer. 
Loyalists are more concerned yet, as in electoral politics 
just maintaining the base is a step forward. For example, why 
PKB that claiming to represent NU organization has never 
been consistent in winning elections between parties with a 
religious organization as well, even NU are huge.This fact is 
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recognized by politicians today, so they use more strategy 
according to the marketies approach than just the kulturalis. 
However, both approaches will remain adoption 
researchers with the operation of culturalis as a guide to 
understanding clientelism that remain in good standing with 
prospective supporters, regardless of whether they have 
social assistance or not, and marketis as the main approach 
that will further pose social assistance into a politician's 
strategy. 
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Researcher began the discussion by showing one of the 
results of an interview with one source when asked how 
social assistence's distribution patterns occurred at the local 
in pandemic. 
Kalau sepengalaman saya bantuan sosial di masyarakat itu 
digunakan untuk orang-orang tertentu. Semisal gini, dari 
pemerintah desa itu mengadakan seperti kemarin ada BLT atau 
sejenisnya, itu yang dapat justru sanak famili pejabat desa. Dari situ 
timbul kecemburuan sosial, dan itu bahkan membuat masyarakat 
bingung. Kenapa kok cuma orang ini yang dapat? Kok gak 
diperuntukan untuk orang ini yang lebih pantas dapat? Kemarin kan 
menonjol sekali, kok yang dapat hanya beberapa, itu pun yang 
dekat-dekat dengan pejabat balai desa. (In my experience, the social 
assistance in the community is used for certain people. For example, 
the village government held it yesterday there was a BLT or 
something, and who received it was the village official's relatives. 
From there, the social jealousy is raising and it even bewildered the 
public. Why only those in particular who receive? Why not give it 
to people who are more deserving? It seems very evident that only 
people who had a close relationship with the village official received 
it yesterday. (Interview, 16th of November 2020) 
The statement "only people who had a close relationship 
with the village official" Indicating what is called by Aspinall 
with a modified product of patronage as one of those on the 
clientelist's network, that is between politicians and 
supporters. This network form interconnected systems that 
contain elements of iteration, status inequality and reciprocal. 
So, the sources' experience that obtained by researcher 
confirms that networks formed by actors involved will 
become more strongly run in accordance with the three 
elements above when bound with a chain or bond.  
Nonetheless, the source also claims that people who 
receive no social assistance, or receiving it too late, only did 
oral or mouth-to-mouth comments, not up to the immediate 
protest.This is where the culturalist clientelist's view is 
relevant. The beneficiaries who are close with village 
officials and other communities are in dilemma. There are a 
lot of causes that have grown back to the practice in the 
source area evidently, that is "recompense" or "loath" and the 
legacy of past political practices preserved to the present day 
by both the village elite and the majority of people who 
maintained the status quo. 
In the larger landscape, national politics, though frequently 
referred to in legal terms, the practice of clientelism has never 
completely disappeared from democratic lives, even more 
dilemma. Political actors, both personally and those tied to 
the party were systematically distributing only social 
assistance to the supporters, especially those who had become 
party loyalists. Unfortunately, in the marketies era loyalty can 
be cultivated only on a mutually profitable network, as PKB 
showed with NU loyalist base. In addition to loyalist 
supporters, politicians are also willing to distribute their 
assistance to communities that identified are have a strong 
posibility to pass their vote on to certain social givers. 
The pattern of the politician sets on social assistance refers 
to Susan C Stoke's faith. Stokes that clientelism is a condition 
in which the party offers material gain only on the condition 
that the beneficiaries return the favor through voting or other 
forms of political support. Simply in electoral political 
practice, constituents have the necessary vote for a 
candidate's victory, which means the candidate has the 
'benefits' of the resources the constituents need, and the 
constituents have the' influence 'to distribute votes for the 
candidates. In the practical domain it is most evident in the 
relational relationship between politicians and mob whether 
loyal like a particular organization, until the floating mass 
which can be pulled out to be sympathizers by largess of 
patronage or an item used as a medium of exchange. 
Further, the clientelism overshadows the beneficiary to the 
point of feeling suffers a punishment when be an apostate 
from an implicit bargaining about the vote profit of the giver 
[15]. It runs so tight, even beneficiaries who do not give 
political preference to politicians who give patronage to 
others are liable, especially through social means. For 
example, as some frequent complaints, the blacklist of the 
beneficiaries of social assistance next period. 
In the orba period, such punishments also occurred mainly 
for civil officials who did not distribute their voice to Golkar. 
But, the condition was different with the orba period where 
the clientelism is concentrated on an institution of state, the 
practice has become more murous and opaque since the 
reformation, where classes once suppressed by minimalist 
civil-society systems, instantly consolidating the spreading of 
new parties. That represents two conditions. At first glance 
reflect citizen aspirations of being articulate, but on the other 
hand, as a result of legacy cultures of the orba, there has been 
a need for political cooperation and multiparty complexity, 
clients are back in the growing category of the "influence 
network" and "benefit network" between patrons and clients 
in the interest of elections.  
Unfortunately, the reformation era that claimed gives a 
legal certainty Instead of producing certainty in the political 
sphere of electoral politics, politicians should work harder to 
solidify their influence in society, as they are in a position of 
open competition between one politician and another that's 
called by Aspinall colonnade clientelism. The problem is that 
the escalation of the electoral competition is accompanied by 
the ideological degradation of voters, which means law is 
winning or losing, based on the extent to which politicians 
benefit the voters. Surely the benefits here are a concrete 
representation of the economic language of daily society. 
Therefore, short-term social assistance, as long as people 
need it, is a targeted strategy. 
In order not to consume significant amounts of force, 
politicians then determine which institutions have the 
powerful influence to give a patronage product with social 
assistance. In this case, social-religious organizations and 
communities within society are the most rational institutions 
for cooperation. Beside, this collaboration makes it 
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unnecessary for politicians to "pouring out" large sums of 
money, it also makes it easier for the party to control voters 
or constituent masses. The organization clearly knows the 
consequences of disobedience to the agreement that was 
included. Because in the grassroot landscape has a dictum 
explaining that in the political activities carried out by 
politicians cannot be free of interest and motives. 
Religious organizations, especially boarding schools 
because it has enormous amounts played a significant role. At 
least there are two influence factors, the first is a definite mass 
of religious organizations. Such as boarding school, As an 
Indonesian subculture, boarding schools are home to a high 
degree of public education. Second, the influence of religious 
leaders to create a popular crowd. The simple argument is 
also acknowledged by Hirokoshi (1976), which says that the 
figure of a religion clearly often plays a role as a decision-
maker or policy aggregate that has great influence, thus being 
able to lead people, especially in the village settings, to carry 
out his decision [17]. 
In this case, the culturalist and the marketist go side by 
side. As Arya Fernandes has pointed out that the recent 
election edition represents a shift in primordial issues to 
economic and development issues used by each competitor 
through socialization and public communication, especially 
in campaigns. Nevertheless, arya has also pointed out that 
identity aspects are also attached to the idea of tying solidarity 
through non-rational aspect or market, which is psychological 
[18]. 
At least finds in this study refer to two of the most vital 
causes of party institutions being less effective. The 
spreading of the social assistance practice was converted into 
a patronage material that can be traded in the clientelist 
network by politicians indicating a party machine that was 
lacking in compliance with institutional regulations. The 
argument is be reinforced by political scientists who have 
special attention to this institutionalization. Vicky Randall 
and Lars Svasand through a study entitled Party 
Institutionalization in New Democracies emphasizes the 
importance of the party's institutionalization aspect according 
to its definition,that is "the process by which the party 
become established in terms of both integrated patterns on 
behaviour and of attitude and culture." [19]. 
According to the records (annotate) Scott Mainwaring, 
there are four dimensions of the party's institutional success. 
First, institutionalized parties are more mature when it comes 
to a conflict management. The differences of opinion and 
attitude among the internal party elite did not lead to 
delegitimizing and disunity. Second, the institutionalized 
party has strong roots in society. Ideology and party platforms 
are accepted by the communities that are the main voter 
bases.Third, the party is accepted and acknowledged by the 
public as a representation of the public interest guaranteed in 
democracy. Fourth, the party ran a routine of work according 
to the structure and procedures clearly agreed upon by the 
members in general, not just a group of a party elite [20]. 
The politicians' rule of game should be inside the 
institutional corridor already implemented by the party. 
Unfortunately, the most important aspect of the 
institutionalization of ideological identity is increasingly 
distorted by a brief view of short-term interests, such as an 
incidental gift, one of them social assistance. 
Based on das sollen, the political party not only owned but 
also ran ideologies, platforms and mass bases that understood 
the direction of the party's struggle. This infusi degree of 
value is relevant to track the extent to which the party has 
connections with popular groups, such as religious 
communities, professional communities, and ethnic 
communities, while also understanding how party members 
act in accessing resources, whether instrumentalists (hoping 
for resources or material reward) are ideological enough.  
This study found that instrumentalists aspect were more 
dominant than ideological aspects. Once more, as presented 
at the outset of this writing, the phenomenon roved with the 
public's perception of increasingly powerful money 
exchanges.  
The infusi failure of value lies with a listlessness of the 
party instills value and screams itself to the public, so the 
public is unable to identify it. What the public thought 
eventually produced pameo, was that the activity of 
politicians and electoral elections was a party to profit in the 
form of material, while one receives only, or if given to an 
organization and a community, then the time span can be 
longer, but with greater quantity and quality delivery of the 
goods. 
Let's look at Aspinall's research that in this case strongly 
supports the findings of researcher. In an election strategy 
carried out by one of the candidates for the position of the 
region's representatives (DPRD) east Java to be re-elected, 
the candidates apply what is called a government patronage 
program. Uniquely, as researchers have noted earlier, the 
relational aspect with an organization of the religious 
activists' network that the candidate was able to get while in 
college. The candidate frankly admits that he was inspired by 
an effective strategy of Ikhwanul Muslimin of holding a 
campaign using religious bases and the work of the loyalists 
to influence other floating masses. Then, after the first period 
of the candidate's election had been successfully selected, he 
immediately initiated a relief strategy for his constituents and 
his networks in the interest of running for the next period 
through effective use of the social items already provided in 
government programs. Aspinall wrote: 
Sebagai hasil dari usahanya dalam memberikan projek dan manfaat 
berskala kecil yang didanai oleh program pemerintah semacam ini, 
basis dukungannya merambah jauh ke daerah perdesaan. Selama 
periode lima tahun pertamanya, bahkan ketika mengunjungi daerah 
pegunungan terpencil dengan mengendarai sepeda motornya, 
setelah membangun kontrak awal, ia merawat jaringan komunikasi 
dengan penerima manfaat, baik melalui komunikasi elektronik 
maupun melalui kunjungan yang ia lakukan beberapa kali. (As a 
result of its efforts to provide projects and small scaled benefits by 
such a government program, this support base extends far into the 
rural. During his first five-year period, even while visiting remote 
mountain areas on his motorbike, after building a first contract, he 
maintained a network of communication with the beneficiaries, both 
through electronic communication and through visits made by him 
several times) [12]. 
The policy taken by the candidates in east Java 
strengthened the Mainwaring and Torcal statements that said, 
“In the advanced industrial democracies, citizen evaluations 
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of leaders contain programmatic, ideological, or party 
identification components”[20]. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This study has successfully answered the principal 
research question, which is the extent that social assistance 
will be the focus for politicians in building the voting 
strategies for the interests of electoral politics. The data that 
researcher have successfully collected show the Indonesian 
political landscape at the time of the covid-19 pandemic 
where politicians, whether individual actors, government 
officials, or party administrators are using social assistance to 
create a network with constituents, while building an image 
for ease of mobilization during an electroal political 
competition.  
The intensity of social assistance giving in a short time is 
clearly affecting politicians, at least giving room for the 
creation of connections between politicians and electoral 
bases. Although social assistance may be given to each 
subject, both individual and community, but politicians more 
travel distribution routes to organizations, especially socio-
religious, because they are viewed as having loyalties that can 
be cultivated over a long period. In addition, the organization 
offers a powerful network of influence to the members who 
are ready to trade with the patronage benefit network, either 
one at a time or a big program, like pork barrel. 
This find is important to be accommodated by public 
policy makers who are inside the government system. For the 
government, this indicates that assistance and government 
programs should be overseen more clearly so that there are 
no social assistance anomalies. It is necessary to go forward 
to a deep research to analyze some of the undisclosed factors, 
like the effectiveness of a patronage in local settings after the 
election and monitoring of civil society groups in escorting 
the delivery of social assistance from the governments by 
officials and politicians. 
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